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Key Events 
Attacks on computer networks have been traced to Russian cybercrime 
organizations which are alleged to be sponsored by the Russian 
government, moreover, it is alleged that Russia leads the world in 
cybercrime and is a sanctuary for the most advanced cybercriminals 
(Lewis, 2018).  
Russia also reportedly maintains special mission submarines and surface 
ships dedicated to deep sea operations against sea lines of 
communication.  These operations are coordinated by the secretive Main 
Directorate Deep Sea Research organization (GUGI) (Pike, 2016).  
Russian threats against power grids have been linked to cybersecurity 
breaches of US power grid control rooms by DragonFly APT (Robinson, 
2018) and GUGI capabilities (Buchanan, 2018) to disrupt computer 
networks and service delivery occurred in Crimea and Ukraine in 2013 
(Nilsen, 2018).  It is alleged the GUGI fleet surface ship Yantar has 
sailed the east coast of Canada (sometime between 2015 and present) 
(Nilsen, 2018).  
Russian deep-sea submarines have the ability to covertly place sensors 
in the Arctic Ocean and along the shelf and basin at depths of 1,000 
meters. This will provide Russia with the intelligence capabilities to 
detect and monitor Arctic Ocean submarines and sea cable signals 
(Sutton, 2016). 
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Nature of Discussion 
This note explores the potential link between GUGI threats to Canadian 
and NATO sea lines of communication.  This exploration is relevant to 
Canada’s Arctic Sovereignty initiative.   
Background 
The threat to sea lines of communication has been explored during a 
tabletop exercise conducted by the Centre for a New American Security 
in 2017. That tabletop exercise considered the impact of a Russian attack 
on NATO sea lines of communication off the coast of Ireland. According 
to public sources, “participants struggled to determine whose 
responsibility it was to restore the cables – the grey zone between state 
and private ownership of sea cables was a significant hurdle for policy-
makers” (Buchanan, 2018).   
Melting ice and developments in technology have prompted a range of 
feasibility studies into the viability of a trans-Arctic sea cable route. 
Arctic Council permanent members Canada, Russia, the US, Norway, 
and Denmark have all, to varying degrees, undertaken assessments of 
potential Arctic data highways.  To date, two Arctic routes have been 
touted, yet only one has made it to the development stage. The first route 
treks along the Northwest Passage, along Canada’s Arctic coastline. 
This cable links data from London to Tokyo and is well into 
development. Dubbed “Arctic Fibre”, and consisting of approximately 
16,000 kilometres of cable, this route was originally a Canadian venture. 
In 2016 Arctic Fibre was acquired by Alaska-based firm Quintillion 
(Buchanan, 2018). 
Key Points of Discussion and West Coast Perspectives 
Canada’s Renewed Arctic Sovereignty (Government of Canada, 2017) 
efforts include:  
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- New patrol ships that will be capable of sustained operation in first-
year ice to ensure we can closely monitor our waters as they 
gradually open up and maritime activity increases.  
- Expanding the size and capabilities of the Canadian Rangers, drawn 
primarily from indigenous communities, that provide a military 
presence and Canada’s “eyes and ears” in remote parts of Canada.  
- A new Canadian Forces Arctic Training Centre is also being 
established in Resolute Bay. 
- Canadian Forces 2018, Operation Nanook will include 
collaboration with Denmark in order to increase interoperability and 
exercise a collective response to emerging cross-border challenges 
(Government of Canada, 2018). 
- June 8, 2017 Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan unveiled the Liberal 
government's long-awaited vision for expanding the Canadian 
Armed Forces in Ottawa which included acknowledging NATO is 
paying increased attention to Russia's ability to "project force" from 
the Arctic and says Canada will be ready to "deter and defend," 
should a situation arise (Frizzell, 2017). 
- Russian GUGI unit has the capability to monitor CAF deployment, 
interfere with underwater cables affecting Canadian 
telecommunications infrastructure.   
What is Not Known? 
How does CAF or NATO conduct monitoring of GUGI type disruption 
or covert monitoring? Can these be distinguished from normal 
disruption of sea lines of communication?  
Should CAF employ Rangers in cyberwarrior model to identify Russian 
undersea cable threats? What does that training encompass?   
What risk/threat assessments need to be conducted to ensure 
cybersecurity issues are addressed which result from cable cutting, and 
signals intelligence gathered by Russia deep submarine and surface ship 
activity?
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